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THE IMPACT OF THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
ON THE CONDUCT OF PEACETIME NAVAL/MILITARY
OPERATIONS
DALE G. STEPHENS*
INTRODUCTION
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) ' entered into force on
November 16, 1994,2 has been hailed as the most comprehensive treaty ever
negotiated on the world's oceans.3 Indeed, it sought to create a new order for
the world's oceans4 and, on the whole, has been generally acclaimed for
having achieved this courageous aim. Foremostly, the LOSC is dedicated to
the peaceful regulation of international maritime matters.5 Accordingly, the
LOSC provides a reliable basis upon which to assess matters pertaining to
resource rights, pollution and environmental controls, and other peacetime
uses of the seas. It does not, however, comprehensively deal with direct is-
sues concerning naval/military operations, and, more specifically, with the
question of the use of force in the maritime context. Such specific regulation,
touching as it does on political sensitivities and balance of power paradigms,
undoubtedly would have been too ambitious. Nonetheless, the LOSC is re-
plete with ambiguity concerning military uses of the seas. The assumption of
legal rights and duties that underpin this ambiguity must be understood if
Lieutenant Commander Dale Stephens, Royal Australian Navy, B.A., LL.B. (Hons),
GDLP. Presently occupying the Command Legal Officer position at Naval Training Com-
mand, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. Previous postings include operational billets at Mari-
time Headquarters (Sydney) and Directorate of Operational and International Law (Canberra).
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Royal Australian Navy, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.
1. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Nov. 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOSC].
2. This occurred one year after having received its 60th ratification in accordance with
Article 308 of the LOSC.
3. See John Mordike & E.E. Casagrande, The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Some
Implications for Air Operations, Am POWERS STUDIES CENTRE, 1 (Royal Austl. Air Force, No.
51, Feb. 1997).
4. See Same Varayudej, The Dispute Settlement System within the UNCLOS, MARITIME
STUDIES 19 (July-Aug. 1997) (citing A. 0. Adede, The Basic Structure of the Disputes Settle-
ment Part of the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 125, 128 (1982)).
5. See LOSC supra note 1, pmbl.
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States are to act responsibly within the strictures of the LOSC. This is par-
ticularly so in recent times with the continuing ratification and accession of
States to the LOSC,6 coupled with the ongoing and increasingly bellicose
maritime disputes in areas of the world such as the Spratly Islands.7
The purpose of this article is to identify and examine, in reference to the
LOSC, the nature of those legal rights and duties concerning the conduct of
naval/military operations and the use of force. It is atheme of this article that
the LOSC does contemplate the use of "necessary" forceful measures to si-
multaneously affirm navigational rights and also to preserve sovereign
coastal interests. Such a "balancing act" between these seemingly irreconcil-
able concerns is not surprising, given the historical legal debate over the
theories of "mare clausum" and "mare liberum "8 and the relative ascen-
dancy of either theory at any given moment of time. The LOSC attempts,
nonetheless, to facilitate this "balancing act" and seeks to buttress these
rights with an implicit recognition that force may be appropriately applied in
certain circumstances. Indeed, the text of the Convention must also be read
in conjunction with an understanding of those rights to employ force more
generally recognized by bodies such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). Such judicial opinion has necessarily influenced the development of
customary international law and is incorporated into the planning processes
of many of the world's "blue water" navies and military forces generally.
This article will first briefly describe the hierarchy of maritime zones
recognized by the LOSC. Allied to this description will be a short outline of
the navigational rights recognized in each of these zones and the implica-
tions such legal regimes have on the naval/military use of the seas. Having
established the legal framework applicable to the various maritime zones, the
article will specifically examine the question of the use of force contem-
plated by the Convention. Indeed, within this analysis, two premier cases on
maritime rights and self-defense, namely the Corfu Channel9 and the Nica-
ragua1 ° cases, will be closely considered. The conclusion is then made that
these cases do support a legal justification for the use of force in certain,
well-defined circumstances, which do have an immediate relevance in the
maritime context. It will be contended however, that such rights to resort to
force are always conditioned on principles of necessity and proportionality,
which remain essential criteria for the legitimacy for any use of force. Hav-
ing made such conclusions, the last part of this article will finally examine,
6. See generally George Galdorisi, An Operational Perspective on the Law of the Sea, 29
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 73-84 (1998).
7. See H.R. Sanguinetti, Is China Preparing for a Military Solution to the Spratlys Dis-
pute?, 87 NAVAL REV. 27 (Jan. 1999).
8. See generally DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 1-
28 (I. A. Shearer ed., 1982) [hereinafter O'CONNELL I].
9. Corfu Channel (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Chan-
nel].
10. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
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in detail, the question of innocent passage of warships through foreign state
territorial seas. Such a scenario provides the clearest interface between mili-
tary navigational rights and coastal state sovereign interests, and the formula
contained within the LOSC provides a valuable insight into the manner in
which such legal rights are sought to be reconciled. The final part of this ar-
ticle thus provides a useful model upon which the competing legal priorities
discussed previously may be meaningfully resolved.
I. MARITIME ZONES WITHIN THE LOSC AND THE IMPLICATION FOR
NAVALIMILITARY ACTIVITIES
The use of naval/military forces to "project power" and influence inter-
national relations has long been a traditional "weapon" in the diplomatic ar-
mory of States. Indeed, the very term "gunboat diplomacy," which now has
general currency, is indicative of the historic use of naval forces as a coer-
cive element in the achievement of national goals.
As a consequence of this usefulness, it is not altogether surprising that
those States possessing strong global or even regional maritime forces have
favored more liberal navigational regimes for the world's oceans. As one
author has noted, the United States of America, for example, has "tradition-
ally maintained a strong Navy to preserve the freedom of the seas and to
support the global commitments associated with its forward Defense strat-
egy. In peacetime, naval forces are routinely deployed overseas as a means
of reassuring allies and deterring political adversaries."'" Indeed, it has been
formally acknowledged by United States officials that continued access to
the "oceans throughout the world, including areas off foreign coasts at great
distances from the United States, is vital to U.S. security and economic in-
terests in global navigation, overflight and telecommunications. ' '12
Such attitudes, as outlined above, are not restricted only to the United
States Government. During even the Cold War, the Soviet Union shared
with the United States a political desire to further expand the navigational
rights of its own "blue water" maritime forces. While incidents sometimes
occurred between these countries, there was a general consensus between the
superpowers that it was in their mutual interest to concede "the legal right of
the other to do what it is doing ... [and] even welcome (albeit silently) the
augmentation of State practice in support of the kinds of operations large na-
vies undertake."' 3
11. Scott C. Truver, The Law of the Sea and the Military Use of the Oceans in 2010, 45
LA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1985) (quoting former Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, Annual
Report to Congress (Feb. 1985)).
12. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA i (2d ed. 1996).
13. Bernard H. Oxman, International Law and Naval and Air Operations, in 64
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 24 (Horace B. Robertson ed.,
1991).
1999]
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As a consequence of these political imperatives, the legal regimes,
which were developed in respect of the maritime zones, were necessarily in-
fluenced by mutual superpower priorities in seeking the greatest scope of
navigational freedom. Such broad interpretations were not, however, univer-
sally endorsed. The expansion of the territorial sea limit, for example, from
three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles was a testament to the resolve of
the smaller coastal States who endeavored to counter any perceived abroga-
tion of their sovereign interests. However, as will be outlined, the smaller
coastal States were not always successful in resisting encroachment on their
sovereign rights. Indeed, in many cases, the promulgation of maritime zones
under the LOSC provided significant legal concessions to the maritime
forces of larger powers.
A. Baselines and Maritime Zones
The LOSC provides for a hierarchy of maritime zones. Within each of
these off-shore zones, coastal and navigational rights are regulated. The
relevant zones may be summarized as comprising internal waters, territorial
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and high seas;' 4 in addition,
there are the cognate zones, comprised of the continental shelf and the archi-
pelagic concept.' 5 The differing legal regimes, which apply to each of these
zones, do necessarily influence the planning and conduct of naval/military
operations.
1. Baselines
While the LOSC prescribes the breadth of each maritime zone, the de-
termination, in each specific instance, of the charted co-ordinates of these
zones rests upon the initial establishment of "baselines" from which these
zones may be plotted. Accordingly, the determination of the baselines has
become a critical exercise.
Article 5 of the LOSC outlines that the "normal" method for baseline
drawing is the low water line along the coast. 6 Article 7 provides for a sys-
tem of straight baselines where a coastline is deeply indented or if there is a
fringe of islands.' 7 This Article of the LOSC simply reflects customary in-
ternational law as outlined in the 1951 Anglo Norwegian Fisheries case,
8
including, as it does, the concession to long-term economic usage factors in
respect of the drawing of the straight baseline. 9 Self-evidently, the drawing
14. LOSC, supra note 1, part II.
15. LOSC, supra note 1, part IV.
16. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 5.
17. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 7.
18. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) [hereinafter Anglo Norwe-
gian Fisheries].
19. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 7(5).
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of straight baselines can have the effect of increasing the area of sea which a
coastal State may claim as a specific maritime zone. In addition, special
rules for the drawing of baselines also apply to bays and the drawing of lines
across the mouth of bays.2'
2. Baseline Challenges-The Operational Interface
a. United States Navy Activities
Given the discretion accorded to States under the LOSC for determining
the manner in which baselines can be drawn, global maritime powers such as
the United States are vigilant in ensuring that coastal States draw baselines
in a manner consistent (at least in relation to United States interpretations)
with the LOSC.
Thus, to ensure that there is no easy acquiescence in excessively
claimed baselines, the United States Navy (USN) is subject to a government
directed "Freedom of Navigation" (FON) program.2' Consistent with United
States national policy, the USN will actively undertake transits in littoral ar-
eas where the drawing of baselines (or the claim of certain other maritime
rights) is disputed. Occasionally, the USN (in concert with its allies) will
schedule military exercises within areas considered to be "international wa-
ters" but which other coastal States contend they exercise overriding national
sovereign rights. The Gulf of Sidra incidents in the early and late 1980s,
wherein USN fighters downed a number of Libyan military aircraft which
challenged such exercises, concerned disputed claims with Libya as to the
status of the Gulf as an "historic bay." 2 Such actions serve to demonstrate
the very real connection between the "dry" law of the Convention and op-
erational realities.
Much like the development of customary international law generally,
the "persistent objector" principle is very relevant to the recognition, or oth-
erwise, of a historic bay. Customary law requires that a State demonstrate an
open effective use of a "historic bay," coupled with acquiescence by other
States for this claim to be legitimate.23 In the context of the latter criterion,
the United States' actions in respect to the Gulf of Sidra, and generally in
relation to the FON program, can be better understood. Accordingly, while
undoubtedly sometimes politically charged, the American approach to chal-
lenging what it perceives to be excessive maritime claims is consistent with
20. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 10.
21. U.S. DEPT. OFDEFENSE, supra note 12, at2.
22. See Dennis R. Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective, NAVAL INST.
PROC. at 26-31 (Jan. 1982); see generally George Galdorisi, The United States Freedom of
Navigation Program: A Bridge for International Compliance with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 399-408 (1996).
23. See Documents of the 14th Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962).
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the decision in Anglo Norwegian Fisheries.24 There, it was suggested that the
general "toleration of a notorious claim" '25 was sufficient to render a claim
valid. This is all the more relevant today when States are actively engaging
in multiple conscious actions in order to crystallize nascent rules in favor of
their own sovereign maritime interests.26
b. Internal Waters
Internal waters comprise those waters on the landward side of the base-
line.27 Internal waters can include ports, rivers, harbors, and bays of the
coastal state. Within this zone, a coastal State enjoys complete sovereignty
over the water column, seabed, and sub-soil. Accordingly, there exists no
right for foreign vessels or aircraft to enter a coastal State's internal waters.
A warship, therefore, is required to obtain diplomatic clearance to enter a
port, though such warship always retains rights of sovereign immunity while
in internal waters.
c. Territorial Seas
The first zone, which extends seaward from the baseline, is the territo-
rial sea. The LOSC allows, under Article 3, every coastal State the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles from its
baseline.28
The majority of States now claim a territorial sea of twelve nautical
miles. The final establishment of the breadth of the territorial sea within the
LOSC represented a major achievement in the consensus process employed
during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and reflected an impetus
that had been initiated by the smaller States. Significantly, this also repre-
sented a progressive development in the law. Prior to the Convention, it was
generally accepted that the breadth of a territorial sea could only extend to a
three nautical mile limit.29 Indeed, until 1988, the United States insisted that
the three-mile limit was the appropriate breadth under international law after
having claimed such a limit since 1793.30
24. See generally Anglo Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
25. A.V. Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the
Contemporary Law of the Sea, in 64 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS 111 (Horace B. Robertson ed., 1991).
26. For example, in relation to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as well as ac-
tions by Indonesia in relation to archipelagic sea lane designation in recent years.
27. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
28. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 3.
29. MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (6th
ed. 1987).
30. The three-mile limit was established by declaration in a letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son, U.S. Secretary of State, to French and British ministers (Nov. 8, 1793), in THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440-42 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895), cited in Annotated Supplement to the
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev.A)/FMFM 1-10, at 1-
6
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In the area of the territorial sea and the air space over that area, the
coastal State has complete sovereignty subject only to the right of "innocent
passage" for ships, but not for aircraft. 3' This proposition has been the basis
for considerable academic debate and international litigation, and will be
comprehensively addressed in the final part of this article.32 Where the ex-
pansion of the territorial sea resulted in the overlap of international straits, a
regime of "transit passage" applies. 33 This allows warships to travel in their
"normal mode," i.e., allowing flight operations and replenishment at sea ac-
tivities. While Article 38(2) of the LOSC mandates that warships conducting
"transit passage" will pass "continuously and expeditiously," 34 the regime is
less onerous than the requirements for innocent passage. Importantly, transit
passage through international straits (and archipelagic sea-lanes which share
a similar navigational regime) is guaranteed under Article 38 the LOSC and
may not be suspended (even in times of conflict with respect to neutral ves-
sels) by those States which border such straits.35
d. Contiguous Zone
In accordance with Article 33 of the LOSC, a coastal State may, in a
zone contiguous to its territorial sea, exercise the control necessary to pre-
vent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sani-
tary laws within its territory and territorial sea.36
The recognition of a contiguous zone, which is defined within the
LOSC as extending for a distance of not beyond twenty-four nautical miles
from the baselines,37 was not a progressive development of the Convention.
Rather, the concept had found its initial treaty prescription in the 1958 Ge-
neva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,38 and its terms
were essentially repeated in the LOSC.
The significance of the contiguous zone principally relates to law en-
forcement actions rather than general questions of military/naval operations.
However, many military forces are engaged in law enforcement activities
relating to the protection of natural resources. Such actions have come to be
characterized as coming within the realm of national security interests.39
13 (Wash. D.C. 1989).
31. LOSC, supra note 1, arts. 17-26.
32. See infra Part III.
33. LOSC, supra note 1, arts. 37-44.
34. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 38(2).
35. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 42(2).
36. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 33(1).
37. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
38. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
39. See Jack McCaffrie, Potential Threats to Australian Maritime Security, in OCEAN
MANAGEMENT AND THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION 37 (Sam Bateman & Dick 0. Sherwood eds.,
1995) (Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong).
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A perennial question relating to the interpretation of Article 33 concerns
the extent of jurisdiction contemplated under this Article. Thus, one
authoritative commentator has queried whether a literal reading of this Arti-
cle only permits the enforcement of the specified classes of laws (customs,
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary) within the contiguous zone once breaches
had been committed within the territory or territorial sea. 4° The broader view
is that breaches of one of the specified classes of laws which occur within
the contiguous zone can be enforced in that zone where it is reasonably ap-
parent that the offending vessellaircraft is about to enter the territorial sea or
has just left it.4 Consistent with general principles of international law, war-
ships enjoy sovereign immunity when in the contiguous zone (and else-
where) and cannot be boarded or subject to coastal State jurisdiction.42 Their
actions can, however, be the subject of diplomatic complaint and claims for
compensation.
e. Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was a progressive development
under the LOSC. This zone, coupled with the Continental Shelf concept,
does recognize sovereign economic rights relating to the exploration, ex-
ploitation, conservation, and management of living and non-living re-
sources.4 3 The zone may extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline."
Unlike some States, western nations generally recognize that foreign naval
vessels may transit through this zone in the "normal mode" and may even
conduct military exercises within a foreign State's EEZ, bound only by the
obligation to have "due regard" to the legitimate resource rights of the
coastal State and, of course, other State users.45 Such an interpretation is
mildly contentious, given the requirement for "peaceful uses" 46 of this zone
mandated by Article 58 of the LOSC,47 though it is quite ambitious to con-
clude, as some publicists do, that reference to "peaceful uses" of the high
seas within Article 88 of the Convention necessarily prohibits all na-
val/military activity within international waters. Such an interpretation is
40. Lowe, supra note 25, at 112.
41. Such an interpretation places great emphasis on the "prevention" aspects of the Arti-
cle, but is consistent with the general thrust of expansive interpretation employed by Superior
Courts within Australia in such matters. See, e.g., Rutu and Ladjilu v. Dalla Costa, 93 A.
Crim. R. 425 (1997), where the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory took an expansive
view on the reach of the Commonwealth Migration Act..
42. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 32.
43. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 56(1)(a).
44. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 57.
45. Francesco Francioni, Peacetime use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of
the Sea, 18 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 203, 215 (1985).
46. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 88.
47. Article 58(2) adopts the provisions of Article 88, which mandates usage of the high
seas only for "peaceful purposes." LOSC, supra note 1, art. 58(2).
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certainly not a preferred one adopted by more measured considerations.48
Given the ascendancy of the EEZ concept, the significance of the Con-
tinental Shelf has somewhat diminished. However, the LOSC does continue
to recognize this zone, which allows full sovereignty rights over the re-
sources of the seabed of the coastal State. 9 Significantly, the LOSC ac-
knowledges that the Continental Shelf can extend beyond the limits of the
EEZ provided that certain geological criteria are satisfied.5" Accordingly,
military activities which do not impinge sovereign economic rights may also
be conducted within this zone.
f Archipelagic Status
The archipelagic concept was a progressive development of the LOSC.
Consistent with the notion of "wawasan nusantara,"' Indonesia, in particu-
lar, sought recognition of the "unity" of the archipelagic nation under inter-
national law with consequential recognition of sovereign rights within archi-
pelagic waters.52 Thus, such archipelagic countries, which are principally
located within the Pacific region, sought a concession relating to the drawing
of baselines around their outermost archipelagic islands with increased rights
in relation to the waters thus enclosed.53 The regime that was reflected in the
LOSC does accord a special legal significance to archipelagic nations and
has created a legal regime which is sui generis. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
given the progressive nature of the archipelagic concept, there exists an on-
going debate as to the precise contour of the rights and obligations inherent
in terms of navigational rights through an archipelago. The relevance of ar-
chipelagic sea lanes passage in the naval context, 54 in particular, has been
subject to considerable debate. The designation of such sea lanes pursuant to
Article 53 of the LOSC is presently subject to consideration by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. The final determination of such sea lanes is
critical given the capacity of archipelagic States to suspend all innocent pas-
sage through their archipelagic waters. Archipelagic sea lanes passage "in
the normal mode" 55 is not affected by such suspension. Accordingly, it re-
mains in the self-interest of all maritime powers to press for the designation
48. Francioni, supra note 45, at 223.
49. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 77.
50. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 76.
51. This is the Indonesian conception of the unity of nation as comprising both the land
territory of their archipelago in conjunction with the enclosed archipelagic waters. See Dino
Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy, 24 INDONESIAN
QUARTERLY 102, 102 (1996). This concept "seems to be related with the concept of National-
ism.... It amalgamates geographical phenomenon with political phenomenon." Id. at 102-03.
52. Id. at 102.
53. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 47.
54. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 49(4).
55. Normal mode connotes aircraft operations for organic aircraft, submerged transit for
submarines and "security steaming" formation for a naval task force.
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of the greatest number of archipelagic sea lanes in accordance with Article
53 of the LOSC.
g. High Seas
Those waters outside the above-mentioned maritime zones constitute
"high seas." 56 Notwithstanding this, many navigational freedoms which were
originally exercisable only on the high seas may now be exercised within
"international waters," which are defined as those waters extending beyond
the territorial sea of a coastal State.57 Significantly, within the high seas (in-
deed, "international waters"), crimes of universal jurisdiction may be com-
mitted which may involve the use of military forces in their enforcement.
Such crimes of universal jurisdiction include war crimes and piracy.
II. PEACETIME RIGHTS TO USE FORCE UNDER THE LOSC
The legal regime contemplated in the hierarchy of maritime zones under
the LOSC does not directly regulate the application of force within those
zones. Notwithstanding this, general customary international law does pro-
scribe behavior that is inconsistent with the prohibition of force, as mandated
under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.58 While, as has been out-
lined, naval and military forces may well be used as a diplomatic tool to
demonstrate a "show of force" or "symbolic expression of support and con-
cern," 59 such actions in the maritime context run the risk of offending the
general prohibition under customary international law on the use or threat-
ened use of force in the conduct of international relations. 60 Accordingly, a
State's maritime forces, when deployed for such purposes, must be careful to
achieve the right balance between mere "presence" and overt "coercion."
These points are indirectly addressed in the LOSC, but have been more fully
expanded upon by the International Court of Justice in a number of court de-
cisions.
A. Treaty Provisions
Article 301 of the LOSC, entitled "Peaceful Uses of the Seas," mandates
in very general language that disputes relating to rights and duties assumed
under the LOSC shall be settled peacefully, in accordance with principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 6' In this re-
56. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 86.
57. U.S. DEPT. OF NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, 2-6 (1995).
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
59. Oxman, supra note 13, at 30.
60. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
61. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 301.
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gard, the Article merely paraphrases Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter by prohibiting the use or threat of use of force by any party in the
exercise of rights or the performance of duties under the Convention.62 The
Article, therefore, is somewhat benign in its failure to precisely deal with the
activities of maritime forces. The abdication of direct regulation of the use of
force is made all the more complete with the inclusion, under Article 298
(1)(b), of an optional exemption from the compulsory settlement of disputes
for "military activities"" and additionally, under Article 298(1)(c) for mat-
ters that have been referred to the Security Council. 64
Notwithstanding the invocation of the prohibition on the use of force
within the LOSC and deference made to the Security Council, it is contended
that the Treaty does, in fact, contemplate the use of "necessary" forceful
measures to affirm navigational rights and to preserve sovereign coastal in-
terests. The legal justification for such measures must be gleaned from an
assessment of the language used within the Convention in conjunction with
an understanding of those rights to employ force recognized by bodies such
as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Remarkably, in two of the three
premier cases decided by the ICJ on the use of force, namely Corfu Chan-
nel65 and Nicaragua,66 maritime navigational rights figured prominently in
the decisions.
B. Decisions of the ICJ
In 1949, the ICJ, in Corfu Channel, made certain observations concern-
ing the use of force which, if taken at their highest, would allow for an inde-
pendent, indigenous authority to use force outside the Charter system. While
expressed in general terms, even those literalist academics 67 who advocate a
narrow interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter68 have felt compelled
to "rationalize" the decision as applying only to the context of narrowly de-
fined maritime rights.
1. The Corfu Channel Case
Corfu Channel was concerned with the transit of British warships
through the Corfu Channel in 1946.69 Against a background of some enmity,
62. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
63. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 298(1)(b).
64. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 298(1)(c).
65. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 4.
66. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
67. See generally IAN BROWNLIB, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES (1963).
68. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the
case of armed attack against a Member. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
69. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 12-13.
1999]
11
Stephens: The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct o
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
294 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
Albanian shore batteries in 1946 fired upon two passing British warships.
Subsequent naval orders were issued directing that four British warships tra-
verse the channel. In October 1946, these vessels were dispatched in battle
readiness, but in a manner which ostensibly preserved their peaceful appear-
ance. In the course of the transit, two of the warships struck mines which
were laid by persons unknown (although the court subsequently attributed
knowledge to Albania).70 British ships were dispatched a third time in "Op-
eration Retail," which took place on November 13, 1946.71 The specific pur-
pose of this transit was to sweep Albanian territorial waters for mines so as
to gather "evidence" of Albanian malfeasance.
a. First and Second Transits
The court chose to treat the first and second transits differently from the
third. In respect of the first and second transits, the court considered that the
ships were conducting "innocent passage. 7 2 In that regard, the court essen-
tially dismissed the Albanian contention that it was the purpose of the transit
which was to be assessed, and instead stated that it was the manner of the
transit which was critical.73 Thus, notwithstanding that it was a time of ten-
sion between Albania and Britain, the court held that a somewhat robust
transit by Britain of four warships was still innocent passage, even though
the ship's company were closed up in "action stations, 74 and the purpose of
the transit was intended to be a demonstration of force seeking to "test" Al-
banian attitudes.75 Importantly, in what was the most significant aspect of the
decision, the court went beyond a mere characterization of "innocent pas-
sage" and ultimately upheld the legality of the British transit on the second
occasion on the basis that it was a "mission" that "was designed to affirm a
right which had been unjustly denied. "76
2. Third Transit
In respect of the third transit, the court was more circumspect. The court
had regard to the number of ships (including an aircraft carrier, cruisers, and
other warships) and the manner of the transit which comprised extensive
mine sweeping activities within Albanian territorial seas.77 In such circum-
stances, the court did not consider that the manner of such activities could
70. Id. at 18, 22.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id. at 31.
73. See id. at 30; Lowe, supra note 25, at 126.
74. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30.
75. O'CONNELL I, supra note 8, at 313; DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY NAVAL OPERATIONS 24-25 (1972) [hereinafter O'CONNELL II].
76. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30 (emphasis added).
77. ld. at 33-35.
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constitute innocent passage and, indeed, considered that the actions of the
British task force constituted an unlawful intervention, which in its nature
was sustained by a threat of the use of force.7 8
a. "Affinning Rights Unjustly Denied"
The decision reached in Corfu Channel has caused considerable debate
within the contemporary academic literature. The eminent jurist Waldock
seized upon the court's decision concerning the second transit as represent-
ing the recognition of an independent right to use force in circumstances
well below the "armed attack" criterion necessary for national self defense
under Article 51 of the Charter. 79 Thus, Waldock considered that the deci-
sion permitted a State to "coerce another State into future good behaviour."80
In short, he was of the view that the court, in that instance, allowed in rela-
tion to the second transit for the existence of a limited right of "forcible self
help" without reference to the United Nations Security Council, or the provi-
sions of the UN Charter. Notwithstanding such a potentially revolutionary
interpretation, he did feel constrained to make a distinction between "a
forcible affirmation of legal rights, which is legitimate, and ... forcible self-
help to obtain redress for rights already violated, which is illegal.' The dis-
tinction is hard to comprehend.
This recognition of an apparently new authority for the use of force has
been stringently criticized. Brownlie, for example, emphatically rejected the
implication that the case gave rise to any kind of prospective general enti-
tlement to forcibly exercise legal rights. In support of his contention, he cites
a respectable corpus of legal authority ranging from the Kellogg-Briand pact
through to the UN Charter and the trend of general customary law concern-
ing the prohibition on intervention.82 Moreover, in attempting to confine the
significance of the court's pronouncement, he notes that the attitude towards
the third transit, disclosed by the court as representing an unlawful interven-
tion and violation of sovereignty, is inconsistent with the very logic outlined
by the court in respect of the reasoning employed when interpreting the sec-
ond transit.83 Such sentiments concerning the internal logic of the case are
shared by other commentators, and indeed, on this point O'Connell opines:
In that case the minesweeping operation was a separate episode, intended
to acquire evidence of the minelaying as much as to clear the channel.
Would the passage of the warships have been less an exercise of rights if
they had been using paravanes during their transit, for the purpose of cut-
78. Id. at 35.
79. See C.H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 RECUIL DES COURs 455, 501 (1952).
80. Id.
81. Id. at502.
82. See BROWNLE, supra note 67, at 287.
83. Id. at 288.
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ting the mine cables and avoiding the mines?
84
In his conclusions, however, Brownlie does recognize a degree of resid-
ual legitimacy for the proposition espoused by the court. Accepting the plain
statement by the court as to the "affirmation of rights," he considered that
the most plausible application for the apparent right to use a limited degree
of force lay in its relevance to maritime matters.8 5 He concludes that "the de-
cision can be confined in its effects to rights of passage, and, prima facie,
rights of passage in straits and territorial waters."86
If this, then, is the lingering legacy of the case, admitted by even its
most trenchant critics, then it does have significant impact in facilitating an
interpretation of the LOSC with respect to naval/military activities in respect
of navigational matters. As a result of this case, it would seem that in respect
of navigational rights, a level of force might well accompany the realization
of such rights in circumstances where those rights are unlawfully denied.
The authority for this proposition derives not from Article 51 of the UN
Charter, but rather from an independent customary right which has been ar-
ticulated by the ICJ. Care must, however, be taken with such a bold pro-
nouncement. Consistent with general theory, and indeed subsequent pro-
nouncements of the court itself, such forcible affirmation of navigational
rights will always be conditioned by the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality,8 7 and, as will also be outlined in the final part of this article, the
more nebulous principle of "humanity," which also has been actively pro-
moted by the ICJ as an important influence on this particular equation. In
light of these subsequent developments, the comments made by the court in
the Corfu Channel case concerning the affirmation of rights must be treated
carefully. As will be demonstrated in the next section, however, the ICJ itself
has subsequently resiled from the more extreme implications of the Corfu
Channel decision and has developed a more holistic test for determining
such transit rights.
C. The Nicaragua Case
The ICJ, in the 1986 Nicaragua case, 88 subsequently addressed the gen-
eral question on the use of force under international law. While not a central
consideration, maritime issues did specifically figure in aspects of that case
and the court's opinion on those aspects remains instructive on the shaping
of naval/military policy in respect of navigational rights and coastal sover-
eignty. In that decision, the court essentially considered the extent of legal
84. As cited in I. A. Shearer, Legal Constraints on Naval Operations and the Rules of
Engagement, Proceedings of the 8th RAN Legal Conference at 74.
85. BROWNLIE, supra note 67, at 287.
86. Id.
87. See generally Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14. at 94, 176.
88. Id. at 14.
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principle concerning the prohibition on intervention in the internal affairs of
States. 89 The case concerned allegations by the Nicaraguan Government that
the United States government was supporting the "Contra" rebels through
various operations (including the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the United
States).90 Counter-allegations by the United States government concerned
the Nicaraguan government's support of rebel elements in neighboring Hon-
duras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.91
1. The Use of Force and the Nicaragua Case
Due to procedural objections, the ICJ considered the issues in this case
in accordance with customary international law, rather than the United Na-
tions Charter.92 In any event, the court considered that the content of the law
was essentially the same. 93 The court was concerned with determining what
amounted to an "armed attack" for the purpose of justifying the application
of force in self defense, 94 and, more pertinently, the options involving force
that were open to a country acting in a situation short of an "armed attack."95
2. "Anned Attack"
As a general proposition, the court held that, consistent with the literal
words of Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State could act in self-defense when
subjected to an "armed attack."'96 The court then set a high threshold stan-
dard for determining the level of attack that was required, finding that the
attack had to be of sufficient "gravity." 97 For situations where an attack may
not have the requisite degree of "gravity," the court allowed that "propor-
tionate countermeasures" could be employed by a State.98 Controversially,
the court determined that a third State might not assist a State who is the
subject of something less than an armed attack. 99 There was, paradoxically
therefore, no conception of collective "proportionate countermeasures" as
there is with collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. l°°
Notwithstanding the general controversy surrounding this particular as-
89. Id. at 18-19.
90. Id. at 21-22, 20.
91. ld. at 70, 126.
92. Id. at 97, 1182.
93. Id. at 99,1 188.
94. Id. at 101, 1191. See also id. at 103-04.
95. Id. at 106,1201; id. at 110, 210; id. at 127,91249.
96. Id. at 102,1 193.
97. Id. at 101,91191;id. at 103, 95;id at127, 249.
98. Id. at 127, [249.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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pect of the decision, the application of the concept of "proportionate coun-
termeasures" in the maritime context is particularly useful. Thus, the asser-
tion of navigational rights is not something that would necessarily justify the
use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.1°' However,
it can be fairly seen as attracting a justification for the use of force under the
authority of "proportionate countermeasures" if such passage was sought to
be denied. This avoids the somewhat tortuous reasoning that some academ-
ics have previously developed that equates denial of sea lanes or non-
innocent passage by vessels or submarines as constituting an "armed attack"
for the purposes of justifying any armed response. 10 2
3. "Proportionate Countermeasures"
The concept of "proportionate countermeasures" as part of the contin-
uum of the right of forceful response was a new one introduced by the court.
What is significant about the reasoning employed by the court is that it al-
lowed a State recourse to "proportionate countermeasures" in a number of
circumstances where an "armed attack" was not necessarily established.
While it is acknowledged that the court did not expressly admit that such
"proportionate countermeasures" could themselves include an element of
force, they certainly did not rule this out, and the better view is that this was
what was intended. 1 3 The established author MacDonald has identified three
grounds, enunciated by the court in Nicaragua, the violation of which would
give rise to the right to proportionate countermeasures, namely:
(a) the prohibition against intervention;
(b) sovereignty; and
(c) freedom of maritime navigation and communication.10
Each one of these grounds will be examined as it relates to the maritime
context.
(a) "The Prohibition Against Intervention"
The court affirmed that "non-intervention" is a principle of international
law under which the legality of the use of force would be judged. 0 5 The
principle of non-intervention was expressed by the court to be based upon
the concept of "coercion.' 1 6 Thus, it held that "a prohibited intervention
101. However, the right of unit self defense would always apply to permit an individual
warship to defend itself if attacked. See D. Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of
Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 126 (1998).
102. See, e.g., O'CONNELL I, supra note 8, at 297.
103. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of
Force and Self Defense, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 135, 138 (1987).
104. See R. St. MacDonald, The Nicaragua Case: New Answers to Old Questions,
CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 127 (1986).
105. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106-08, 11202-205.
106. Id. at 107-08, 1205.
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must.., be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.... Intervention is wrongful
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must re-
main free ones."'07 The court then ventured an observation that the principle
is violated not only in respect of the use of direct force, but also by the appli-
cation of indirect force including, for example, monetary support for subver-
sive or terrorist activities.' 0
This point raises the question of "innocent passage" and, to an extent,
brings into reexamination the opinion of the court in Corfu Channel and the
court's apparent toleration, in that instance, of a naval "demonstration of
force."' 09 As the commentator Lowe has noted, the question of "naval dem-
onstrations," while ostensibly peaceful, may have indirect and nefarious con-
sequences that may implicitly violate the principle of non-intervention. Thus,
a programmed transit by a naval force through the territorial sea of an an-
tagonistic State at a time of civil unrest and subversive agitation, although
ostensibly peaceful in its manner, must call into question the very issue
which the court in Nicaragua was considering. 01 That issue is whether such
a transit can be considered to have the necessary element of "coercion" to
violate the principle of non-intervention. Such violation would give rise to a
right by the coastal State to employ proportionate countermeasures to restore
the status quo ante, even if the overt manner of the transit by the naval task
force was consistent with the literal requirements of innocent passage.
Notwithstanding the conclusions reached by the court in Nicaragua, it
would appear that the limits of application of the non-intervention principle
in the maritime context extend only to the edge of the territorial sea. In the
case itself, Nicaragua had asserted that USN maneuvers just outside the
Nicaraguan territorial sea did constitute a threat to use force and thus did
violate the principle of non-intervention.' Significantly, the court did not
accept this particular claim and instead recognized that such maneuvers did
not posses the requisite threat of the use of force." 2
(b) "Sovereignty"
The court considered the principle of "sovereignty" in relation to the
question of overflight of national airspace (which includes airspace above
territorial waters). In particular, the court focussed on the aerial trespass of
Nicaraguan national airspace by United States reconnaissance aircraft." 3 In
the circumstances, the court considered that such actions constituted a viola-
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See supra Part II.BI.
110. Lowe, supra note 25, at 117.
111. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 53, 92.
112. Seeidat118, 227.
113. See id. at 52-53, 991.
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tion of national airspace and thus "sovereignty," though the court seemed
unable to regard such activities as constituting a threat of force. 14 This is
significant in that the court would not appear to allow the use of force under
the aegis of "proportionate countermeasures" to counter such infringe-
ments." 5
The attitude of the court in this instance is, as MacDonald aptly notes,
consistent with established international opinion concerning the use of force
to down civilian airliners which overfly national boundaries. The outraged
world opinion following the shooting down of civilian flight KAL 007 by
Soviet forces in 1983 is a testament to the political, if not legal, interpreta-
tion of such actions." 6 Indeed, as a result of this particular incident, the
Convention on International Civil Aviation was expressly amended to ensure
that the use of military force to down civilian airliners which strayed over
national boundaries was reserved as a matter of absolute last resort, and only
justified in circumstances of genuine national self defense. 1 7
Notwithstanding these views, it is difficult to assume that a violation of
airspace by a military aircraft (launched from a transiting naval vessel or
otherwise) would, in every case, amount to only a "mere trespass," as
viewed by the court in Nicaragua. Indeed, as MacDonald opines, the court's
opinion must be rationalized on the particular facts before it, and he suc-
cinctly states "[ilt would be difficult to argue that low level overflight by
squadrons of hostile aircraft over a capital city could not constitute a threat
to the territorial integrity and political independence of a State."" 8 Indeed, it
would denude the content of "proportionate countermeasures" if force could
not ultimately be employed to down military aircraft that strayed over na-
tional airspace (i.e., over territorial/archipelagic waters). Indeed, if the con-
cepts of "territorial integrity" or "political independence" are to have any
meaningful significance in the context of sovereign airspace, then it must be
contemplated that straying military aircraft may represent a sufficient
enough threat to warrant the use of necessary and proportionate force to
down such aircraft. Of course, such actions would only be permitted after the
requisite international warnings and recognized signals had been made and
interception and landing efforts attempted, but ultimately the use of such
force must be contemplated and the application of such force justified in
those very exacting circumstances.
114. Seeid. at 128, 251.
115. MacDonald, supra note104, at 139-40.
116. Id. at n.42; see generally Marian N. Leich, Agora: The Downing of lran Air Flight
655, 83 AM. J. INT'LL. 319 (1989).
117. See Article 3 bis, Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation, signed May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705.
118. MacDonald, supra note 104, at 140.
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c. "Freedom of Communications and Maritime Commerce"
The final principle highlighted by the court was the principle of "free-
dom of communications and maritime commerce."'"19 The principle was as-
sessed in the context of the laying of mines in Nicaraguan ports by agents of
the United States. In essence, the majority judgement of the court concluded
that such activities violated the right of foreign vessels to enjoy access to an-
other State's ports. 2 ° Moreover, the laying of such mines within internal
waters without sufficient notification was considered to violate the principles
underlying Hague Convention No. VIII,' 21 which were considered to apply
by way of customary law. 122
Such a conclusion is somewhat remarkable given the fact that the Con-
vention is formally applicable only in the event of armed conflict, although
admittedly, it was the "humanitarian" principles 123 which underpin this Con-
vention which the court considered were attracted. As with the general rea-
soning already highlighted, the court would presumably permit "proportion-
ate countermeasures" by other States when transiting mine-infested waters,
even if those waters were the territorial seas of a foreign State. 124 This would
seem to be confirmed by the "humanitarian" basis of the principles identified
by the court. Such measures, although not consistent with innocent passage
within the territorial sea, are justified pursuant to the stated principle of
"freedom of maritime communication and commerce."' 25 Significantly, the
court referred to the LOSC 126 expressly in enunciating this principle, and
emphasized that in accordance with the terms of the LOSC, "a State which
enjoys a right of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all the freedom nec-
essary for maritime navigation. ' 27
Support for this principle in Nicaragua would seem to be in contrast
with the court's negative attitude to the British mine clearing task group in
Corfu Channel. In that regard, it is submitted that the court's decision in
Nicaragua is the better authority. Aside from the internal logical inconsis-
tency of the court's reasoning already highlighted, 21 the court's opinion in
Corfu Channel was particularly influenced by the political aftermath of the
Second World War. The court itself was at pains to legally restrict what it
saw as forceful impulses that gave rise to unacceptable escalation in the
119. Nicaragua, 1986I.C.J. at 111-12, 214.
120. Id. at 111-12, 214.
121. Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Con-
tact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541.
122. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 112,1215.
123. Id.
124. This is assuming that innocent passage has not been suspended within the territorial
sea in accordance with Article 25 of the LOSC.
125. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at I11-12, 214.
126. Id. at 111 214.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 81-84, and accompanying text.
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context of the Second World War. 12
9
Moreover, the court was somewhat hamstrung by submissions from the
U.K. Government in the "pleadings" to the case, wherein the British Gov-
ernment seemed to concede that mine sweeping activities did constitute an
intervention, but were excusable in these particular circumstances. 3 ° Given
such a submission, it is not altogether surprising that the court refrained from
establishing a new exception to the principle of non-intervention.
In summary, therefore, it is submitted that Nicaragua does have a
greater objectivity attached to it and is the better authority on this point. Ac-
cordingly, actions undertaken in the name of preserving maritime freedom,
even within territorial waters, may be justified. Such actions or "proportion-
ate countermeasures" can be asserted in order to allow actions necessary to
ensure the integrity of the right of innocent passage.
D. The Content of "Proportionate Countermeasures"
On the authority of Nicaragua, it would appear that a coastal State may
employ "proportionate countermeasures" to address a violation of any of the
espoused principles.13' Being "proportionate," such measures may them-
selves have a forceful element to them.
Some publicists have never doubted that a coastal State could employ
force in such circumstances. O'Connell, for example, always maintained that
force may be employed to preserve sovereign interests. He was compelled,
however, to interpret such forceful responses in accordance.with Article 51
of the UN Charter, which, as outlined above, was rather an imperfect manner
of interpretation. 132 Thus, it was always difficult to conclude that violations
of an obligation to observe "innocent passage" criteria would necessarily
give rise, on every occasion, to an "armed attack," thereby permitting the use
of force by the coastal State under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
It is preferable now to rely on the interpretation of the ICJ in the Nica-
ragua case and acknowledge that application of force as a "proportionate
countermeasure" in certain circumstances is justified. However, the pa-
rameters or legality of the "proportionate counter measures" will be judged
in accordance with the degree and nature of the threat.
As outlined above, overflight of territorial seas or archipelagic waters
must give rise to a right to employ graduated force to preserve the territorial
integrity of the State. 33 The issue of warship violation of the rules of inno-
cent passage is a little more ambiguous. Official United States reaction to the
seizure of the USS Pueblo by North Korean forces in 1968' was to deny the
129. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 35.
130. Id. at 34.
131. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
132. O'CONNELL II, supra note 75.
133. See supra Part II.
134. On January 23, 1968, the USS Pueblo was captured by North Korean forces while
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right of seizure, and rather, maintain that a coastal State would be permitted
only to escort foreign naval vessels from the territorial sea. O'Connell con-
cludes that the issue is "legally anomalous."' 35 One might determine, though,
that in the case of the USS Pueblo (an acknowledged electronic surveillance
ship), that actions in seizing the vessel (if indeed it was in the North Korean
territorial sea, which was flatly rejected by the United States) were "propor-
tionate," given the particular compromise to national security that the pres-
ence of the ship may have represented.
136
E. National Security
The LOSC itself, pursuant to Article 25, does anticipate that in the in-
terest of "national security" a coastal State may temporarily suspend inno-
cent passage through specified areas of its territorial sea/archipelagic waters
if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security.137 If a State
imposes such a suspension, it must be for a temporary period only, and it
must be non-discriminatory in its application. 13 8 This suspension does not
apply to archipelagic sea lanes or international straits (i.e., straits of
Malacca) where the right of "archipelagic sea lane passage," transit passage,
or at the very least, the right of non-suspensible innocent passage is pre-
served, even in a time of conflict.
139
The authority to suspend innocent passage within a state's own territo-
rial sea is specifically provided for in the LOSC. Given this, it would be dif-
ficult for a State to legally resist another State's reliance upon "proportionate
countermeasures" to assert navigational freedoms within territorial seas/ar-
chipelagic waters where the coastal State has not formally suspended such
passage in accordance with Article 25 of the Convention.
1. Summary on the Use of Force in the Maritime Context
Nicaragua is instructive in its analysis of customary law as it relates
generally to the naval/military use of the sea. The criteria of "gravity" is in-
troduced in relation to determining the legitimacy of measures of self de-
fense. However, for the use of force which falls below the requisite level of
gravity, the majority of the court did envisage that a State could use "pro-
in the Sea of Japan. Eighty-three crew members were held captive for nearly a year. The ship
was equipped with electronic surveillance equipment, and its mission was to track signals
from North Korea in order to determine military capability. See Mary Anne Clancy, Capture
of Pueblo Recalled; Maine Man Endured North Korean Torture, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov.
11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13321003.
135. O'CONNELL I, supra note 8, at 965.
136. See id. at 964 (citing BUTLER, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1969)).
137. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 25.
138. Id. art. 25(3).
139. Id. art. 45(2).
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portionate countermeasures" to protect certain fundamental interests. Im-
plicit in the concept of "proportionate countermeasures" was the right to re-
spond with force. This would apply to activities that not only expressly vio-
lated Article 2(4), but rather the principles of "non-intervention,"
"sovereignty" and "freedom of maritime communication and commerce,"
which were identified expressly by the court. Counter force would only be
justified, however, where there is an element of threat of force, direct or in-
direct, though there would seem to be no right of collective countermeasures.
Consistent with the reasoning of the court in the Nicaragua case, it
would seem the right of freedom of navigation is one which can be enforced
in circumstances where it is unjustly denied, particularly when such denial
also violates principles which underpin humanitarian law. While this aspect
would be consistent with Corfu Channel, the court's enunciation of the prin-
ciple of non intervention (with its emphasis on the indirect use of force and
concept of coercion) could be regarded as conflicting with the court's gen-
eral toleration of a "naval demonstration" in Corfu Channel. Accordingly, it
is always a fine line between constituting an assertion of navigational free-
dom and a violation of the prohibition against intervention. Thus, in times of
heightened tension (in particular), there is a basis for reviewing the purpose
as well as the manner of the passage of naval vessels through the territorial
sea of a coastal State.
III. TERRITORIAL SEAS (ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS) AND THE RIGHT OF
INNOCENT PASSAGE
The perennial balance sought between coastal state sovereign rights and
maritime navigational rights finds its apogee in the context of "innocent pas-
sage" by a warship through a foreign territorial sea (or archipelagic waters).
It is within this maritime zone that the interface between competing rights is
most pronounced. In view of this conflict, it was not surprising that the ICJ
in Corfu Channel sought to provide "benchmarks" for determining the le-
gitimacy of innocent passage. However, beyond establishing that a right of
non-suspensible innocent passage existed for international straits, the court
did very little to specifically define the essential nature of innocent passage
and also refrained from unambiguously declaring that the right existed for
warships within foreign territorial seas or archipelagic waters.' " As a result,
efforts were made in the LOSC to provide a more comprehensive "code" of
what constituted "innocent passage" and also to confirm that such rights
could be exercised by warships within territorial seas (and archipelagic wa-
ters). Examination of this "code" through this next Part provides a useful ba-
sis upon which to examine the attempted resolution of the conflicting legal
rights. Such an examination provides a ready model within which the case
law and views of publicists already canvassed in this article may be joined
140. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30.
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and more general conclusions concerning the application of the LOSC to
military/naval activities may be made.
A. Section 3 of Part II of LOSC
Article 17 of the LOSC makes it clear that "ships of all States... enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 1 41 The general
proposition of "passage" is then defined within Article 18 to be passage
which is "continuous and expeditious."'' 42 This is then expanded in Article
19(1) of the LOSC, which provides that passage is "innocent so long as it is
not prejudicial to peace, good order or security of the coastal State.' ' 43
The general formula of words "peace, good order or security" of a
coastal State is not without its difficulties, especially for warships. Histori-
cally, there were prevailing views that passage by a warship through a for-
eign territorial sea was, by its very nature, prejudicial to the "peace, good or-
der and security of the coastal State." Indeed, counsel for the United States
in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration' 44 asserted the argument
against warships enjoying such rights when he pithily stated: "Warships may
not pass without consent into this zone, because they threaten. Merchant
ships may pass and repass because they do not threaten.' ' 45
Such attitudes have not held sway. Notwithstanding this, there does ex-
ist a residual attitude in some quarters that the concept of warship transit and
"innocent passage" are somewhat contradictory.
B. "Prior Notification" and "Permission"
The mere presence of a warship within a foreign territorial sea remains a
sensitive and politically-charged issue. Indeed, given the views of Nicaragua
as to "coercion" and violation of the principle of non-intervention, such po-
litical concerns may arguably have a degree of legal authority which under-
pin their legitimacy. In view of this sensitivity, there has been a long empha-
sis by some States in establishing a legal requirement for warships to seek
permission from the coastal State prior to undertaking innocent passage or,
at least giving prior notification before undertaking such passage.
In his detailed factual analysis of the multi lateral conferences which led
to the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, the publicist Ngantcha closely docu-
mented the political machinations which occurred during those Conferences,
and the considerable efforts made to include provisions relating to the issue
141. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 17.
142. Id. art. 18(2).
143. Id. art. 19(1).
144. North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910).
145. Cited in Lowe, supra note 25, at 119.
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of warship notification and permission. 146 With equal force, however, other
global maritime powers at these Conferences sought to maintain the status
quo in resisting such a requirement. These latter views were somewhat vin-
dicated in the opinion of the court in Corfu Channel (and subsequently in
Nicaragua) and, indeed, in respect of the history of state practice in which
there is no evidence of apparent acquiescence to the demands of states for
prior notification or permission.' 47
In any event, requirements for prior permission or notification were not
included "as black letter law" within either the 1958 Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1 8 or the LOSC. On the other hand, the
LOSC, in particular, does allow a coastal State under Article 21 to adopt
laws "in conformity with international law' ' 149 relating to innocent passage
and concerning a number of topics, including safety of navigation, pollution
control, and economic resource rights. Such laws may well result in the indi-
rect denial of innocent passage rights by prompting a coastal State to request
a warship to leave the territorial sea if in breach of these laws, but this Arti-
cle cannot be used to preemptively deny passage.
It should be noted, however, that the view regarding prior permission
and notification retains a degree of currency within certain Asian interpreta-
tions. Indonesia appears to consider that such rights persist as a matter of
customary international law.'5 ° However, the general view of Western na-
tions is that innocent passage of warships is an undoubted right, and is not
dependent upon the provision of prior notification or the obtaining of prior
permission. Indeed, it was expressly recognized in the "Joint Statement of
the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage"'' between the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that warships had
the right of innocent passage without the need for prior authorization or noti-
fication.
C. Innocent Passage Judicially Defined
Corfu Channel remains the most authoritative judicial statement on the
definition of innocent passage. As may be recalled, the court approached its
interpretation of the second and third transits differently when determining
whether the British deployment was "innocent." In respect of the second
transit, the court was able to determine that notwithstanding the "demonstra-
tion of force" that was intended by the transit, the vessels were engaging in
146. See FRANCIS NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EvOLUTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 142-45 (1990).
147. See id. at 137.
148. 15 U.S.T. 1606 (1958).
149. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 21.
150. Djalal, supra note 51. at Il1.
151. Signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1444.
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innocent passage.' 52 The court seemed at pains to conclude that such passage
was "innocent," and its reasoning does have something of a tendentious tone.
Rather than provide any kind of definitive statement on the core features of
innocent passage, the court chose merely to comment on the external indicia
of the transit. Thus, notwithstanding Albanian objections concerning the po-
litical purpose of the transit, the court emphasized that the ships passed
through the channel in line and in a continuous manner, and that their un-
loaded guns were trained "fore and aft," which was their traditional peace-
time position. 53 One will look in vain for any further elaboration of the re-
quirements for innocent passage. Accordingly, provided that warships transit
in an ostensibly peaceful manner (with respect to the training of weapons
and the like) then, on the authority of the Corfu Channel decision, the pur-
pose of the transit is irrelevant, even if it may be perceived as amounting to
something of a demonstration of force. 54 Where, however, the manner of
transit exceeds being an assertion of navigational freedom, then it may not
be regarded as constituting innocent passage.
Such an interpretation on what is constituted by innocent passage can-
not, now, be considered to be good law. As maintained in the previous Part,
as a result of Nicaragua, a more holistic approach needs to be adopted when
determining whether, in a particular circumstance, passage may be consid-
ered to be innocent. It is contended that the purpose of a particular transit is
relevant, indeed, almost critical, to the determination. The introduction of the
element of "coercion" into the equation of determining whether a state-
sponsored action violates the prohibition against intervention, must now im-
pact upon the determination of what constitutes "innocence" in respect of
maritime passage rights. While this new formula necessarily makes the task
of determining "innocence" all the more difficult, it also allows the analysis
to be more politically realistic. Indeed, in an effort to be more prescriptive,
such considerations were included within the express terms of Article 19(2)
of the LOSC, which goes far in distilling the character of what is now con-
templated by the concept of "innocent passage."
D. Article 19(2)
While in the modern era it has been unassailably established that war-
ship transit through a foreign territorial sea is not, in itself, inconsistent with
innocent passage, the generality of the expression "peace, good order or se-
curity" continued to cause considerable disquiet as to its meaning. In an ef-
fort to provide greater direction, Article 19(2) of the LOSC included a spe-
cific outline of those activities which are deemed to be prejudicial, and thus
not consistent with innocent passage. The list includes activities that are par-
152. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 31.
153. Id.
154. See Lowe, supra note 25, at 126; O'CONNELL I , supra note 8, at 313.
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ticularly pertinent to naval vessels and in this regard provides, inter alia,
prohibitions on:
a. the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of the coastal State;
b. any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
c. any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense
or security of the coastal State;
d. any act of propaganda aimed at effecting the defense or security of
the coastal State;
e. the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
f. the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
g. any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or
any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; and finally
h. any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 55
The question which is raised by this illustrative list of activities is how
such concepts are to be interpreted as a matter of law. Thus, as one authori-
tative commentator has noted:
At what point, for instance, do monitoring coastal installations and broad-
casts, soundings on the seabed or the testing of the salinity or temperature
of the water amount to the collection of information to the prejudice of the
defense or security of the coastal State.... Is the towing of a military de-
vice such as a towed sonar array, put overboard before entry into the ter-
ritorial sea and taken aboard after leaving the territorial sea, caught by...
[the prohibition not to launch, land or take on board any military de-
vice].'
56
On the whole, however, the list does give greater clarity to the regime that
applies. Many of the prohibited activities do have something of the "coer-
cive" element within them. This necessarily corresponds with the interpreta-
tion given in Nicaragua to actions that may be characterized as constituting
unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of a State.
E. Summary-The Legal Matrix for Innocent Passage
Article 19 of the LOSC has genuinely assisted in providing a reliable
basis upon which to assess the meaning of innocent passage. The Article
must, however, be interpreted in accordance with general customary interna-
tional law. While Corfu Channel and Nicaragua gave emphasis to naviga-
tional rights, it is clear that within each case, there were very defined limits
on the extent of the navigational regimes promoted.
In respect of submerged submarine transit within territorial waters or
overflight of national airspace boundaries (which extend to the edge of the
territorial sea limits), the options are somewhat straightforward. There sim-
155. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 19(2).
156. Lowe, supra note 25, at 117.
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol29/iss2/3
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
ply does not exist any right of innocent passage in these circumstances. In-
deed, while overflight issues already have been canvassed in this article, and
the conclusion made that there do exist residual coastal State rights to em-
ploy force, the situation with respect to submerged submarine transit is even
more straightforward. Thus, in accordance with Article 20 of the LOSC,
submerged submarine passage within the territorial sea is not consistent with
innocent passage, and the inherent threat that such a platform represents will
ultimately enable the use of direct force under the banner of "proportionate
countermeasures" to remove such a threat. Certainly, as O'Connell high-
lights, State practice in relation to past Swedish and Norwegian reactions to
submerged submarine contacts in their territorial sea would tend to bolster
such conclusions. 1
57
The issue relating to surface vessels is more problematic. The determi-
nation of what constitutes "innocent passage" in each circumstance requires
critical evaluation of both the manner and purpose of each transit. The court
in Nicaragua seemed unable to determine whether navigational or coastal
State rights were to have preference. It would turn, it seems, on the issue of
"coercion" inherent in any purported assertion of innocent passage, and the
activities outlined in Article 19(2) will need to be interpreted according to
that criterion.
The options open to a coastal State when faced with a deployment of
naval vessels that is not "innocent" are somewhat ambiguous. The LOSC
states, somewhat prosaically, in Article 25(1) that a coastal State "may take
the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not inno-
cent,"' 58 but the question remains as to the nature and level of the "necessary
steps" which are available to a coastal State. If the decision in Nicaragua is
applied in this context, then, of course, "necessary steps" may be interpreted
as "proportionate countermeasures" and subject to the same constraints as
have been already outlined. However, it is also open to conclude that the
grounds for employing these "necessary steps" may possibly (on occasion)
be broader than the grounds outlined by Nicaragua (i.e., unlawful interven-
tion) in that forcible action may be initiated in accordance with a literal
reading of the Convention when a warship or aircraft violates the specific
prohibition contained within Article 19(2). Even so, such measures must be
proportionate and may well be restricted in the ordinary course to a simple
request to the offending vessel or aircraft to leave the territorial sea or archi-
pelagic waters. Ultimately, however, it is submitted that the use of necessary
and proportionate force to seize or finally even sink such vessels may be
justified as both a "necessary step" and a "proportionate countermeasure."
When determining the correlative rights that a coastal State has when
acting in response to an act of "non innocent passage," the resort to force
must be a "last" resort rather than the first option relied upon. While it is
157. See O'CONNELL I, supra note 8, at 297.
158. LOSC, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
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submitted that the court in Nicaragua contemplated the application of force
within the context of "proportionate countermeasures," it was also empha-
sized in that case,' 59 and indeed in the earlier Corfu Channel case"W and the
subsequent Nuclear Weapons'6 case, that the "principle of humanity" neces-
sarily applied to the determination of the question of the use of force in the
maritime context. While emphasized in the three cases, the court each time
refrained from providing any kind of elaboration on the content of the prin-
ciple. Perhaps it is to have an effect like the celebrated "Martens clause
' 162
in the realm of the jus in bello and, therefore, act as a measure of "public
conscience." In any event, the principle is relevant and tempers the strict in-
terpretation on the right to resort to force, a factor that must, it is submitted,
be constantly included in the matrix of decision making concerning the ap-
plication of force for both protecting sovereign coastal State interests and as-
serting navigational rights, such as the right of innocent passage.
CONCLUSION
The LOSC has been described as the "most ambitious multilateral law-
making instrument ever attempted in the history of diplomacy.' 163 It has
brought a welcome level of legal certainty to an area of international law that
has been subject to considerable uncertainty for centuries. This is particu-
larly so in the establishment of a detailed regime concerning the various
maritime zones which extend seaward of the land territory of States.
While the regulation of environmental and other peacetime uses of the
seas may allow one to conclude that the Convention is somewhat benign in
its regulation of the sea, the reality is somewhat different. Naval/military
forces of all States do confront each other over imaginary lines on the ocean
which have a very real significance on State-endorsed charts. The question
concerning the use of force is not expressly dealt with in the Convention,
although, as outlined in this article, the ambiguous nature of the language
used within the LOSC reveals an acknowledgment that such issues would be
necessarily relevant. One needs to turn to customary international law and
the judicial decisions in a number of cases to glean the legal prescription for
this contentious issue . In essence, all the cases and supporting customary
international law point to a balancing of interests between State sovereign
rights over maritime zones against navigational freedoms to sail or overfly
those same zones. The right to use force to protect either of these interests is
159. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 112, 215-218.
160. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
161. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8).
162. Hague Convention No. IV Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
163. I.A. Shearer, Should Australia have Ratified the Convention?, Paper Delivered at
the Centre for Maritime Policy/International Law Association Seminar: The UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Wollongong (Nov. 4-5, 1994).
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ultimately acknowledged in certain narrowly defined instances. However,
resort to such force is tempered with the absolute legal requirement that such
force be both necessary and proportionate, and also, it would seem, that such
force not offend "humanitarian" principles.
The LOSC was never going to comprehensively regulate or prohibit the
application of force within the maritime environment. Even so, the Conven-
tion, with its detailed regime of navigational rights, has gone far in realizing
its noble goal of preserving and supporting the peaceful use of the world's
oceans, even in the context of considering the military/naval uses of the seas.
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